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Abstract
In the context of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ as 21st Century’s threat to peace and security, 
this  paper intends to address the role of Lawfare. The use of law as a weapon, Lawfare,1 
1 This term was coined by Colonel Dunlap in 2001. See C. Dunlap, ‘Law and Military Interven-
tions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts’, Humanitarian Challenges in Military 
Intervention Conference, November 2001, Harvard University; C. Dunlap, ‘Lawfare today: A 
Perspective’ (2008) 3 Yale J. Int’l Affaires 146, at 146.
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can have a tangible impact on democratic States when their adversaries use it in an ex-
ploitative way. Lawfare can be used in the context of Hybrid War.2 Examples of Hybrid 
Warfare as witnessed in the Russian/Ukrainian conflict of 2014/2015 and the ongoing 
conflict with Daesh are particularly sensitive to Lawfare due to an apparent asymmet-
ric adherence to the international rule of law among involved actors. The different 
legal and ethical approach of democratic States in warfare and their  non-democratic 
opponents in Hybrid War scenarios has the potential to impact negatively on the 
eventual prompt success of Western military actions. The authors argue that against 
this backdrop it is essential for law-abiding nations to adapt an approach which uses 
counter-Lawfare means in support of its own legitimate objectives and to prevent op-
ponents from using it law as a weapon for their own strategic purposes.
Keywords
hybrid war – lawfare – Russia – Ukraine – rule of law – Daesh – 21st century conflict
 Introduction
Hybrid Warfare as a method of war is not new. Hybrid Warfare as a method of 
warfare has its roots in methods of war fighting of past conflicts; while not nec-
essarily new as a category of conflict, it has the potential to change the future 
conceptualization of conflict.
In military historiography,3 it is easy to find examples of conflicts in which 
different actors, States and non-State entities alike, aim to reach their political 
and/or military goals by using a mix of conventional and non-conventional, or 
irregular, methods, as well as kinetic and non-kinetic means, in very different 
operational environments.
The variance today appears to be that Hybrid Warfare “has the potential to 
transform the strategic calculations of potential belligerents [it has become] 
increasingly sophisticated and deadly”.4 Some of the non-kinetic aspects 
2 The term Hybrid War/Warfare will be used interchangeably within this article.
3 Consider the examples of the Spanish guerrillas during the Roman conquest, or the War of 
Independence against Napoleonic armies, George Washington’s militias of free men against 
British forces during the wars for us independence, and the use of both, Palestinian-Jewish 
and – Muslim irregular forces, used by British regular forces against revolts in Palestine dur-
ing the mandate.
4 A. Deep ‘Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques’, Small Wars Journal (2 March 2015).
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of Hybrid Warfare share methods with ‘influence operations’ by aiming to 
 misinform world opinion (like Russia in Crimea and now Syria) or become a 
powerful ‘force multiplier’ (like Jihadists and Daesh in the Middle East). These 
methods have a long history of successful employment. As Sun Tzu once said: 
“[t]o subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence”.5
This short paper briefly presents the concepts of Hybrid Warfare and Law-
fare, the use of law as a weapon, and tries to foster discussion and thought on 
how to use Lawfare affirmatively in support of own objectives and to prevent 
opponents from successfully using law maliciously for their own purposes and 
objectives.. For this, we attempt to provide a current, comprehensive definition 
of Hybrid Warfare and examine some recent developments in this emerging 
area of study, including some reflection on The North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation nato’s open source perspective on ‘Hybrid Threats’. Then, we will take 
a look at different areas where law has been or is being used as a method of 
war. Lawfare encompasses both affirmative activities reinforcing the rule of 
law (often in a defensive context) and its malicious use and exploitation (in 
an offensive context) by an opponent to achieve strategic objectives. Lawfare 
can be used successfully in the following three legal fields: the Jus ad bellum, 
the Jus in bello, and finally the law of treaties in international relations. In de-
tail, we will examine several present and past examples where Lawfare has 
been employed maliciously in order to erode and delegitimize the opponent 
by ignoring or even abusing law with the intent to create confusion in internal 
and external public opinion or to counter any affirmative use of Lawfare to the 
adversary’s tactical or operational advantage. The paper concludes with the 
observation that Lawfare has become an integral element of any Hybrid War-
fare strategy and that its affirmative use has to become an element of Western 
military thinking and planning.
1 Hybrid Warfare
We understand that definitions pose a challenge for commentators since they 
are elusive and tend to leave out key points of the element they are trying to 
define. However, in general, a shared understanding of the term is necessary 
for any further discussion. Military writers, predominantly from the us, have 
discussed Hybrid War since the beginning of the 21st century and its recogni-
tion as a theory in formal military doctrinal thinking still not guaranteed. In 
order to find a binding definition it is important to look at the use of the term 
5 T. Sun, The Art of War,. The Book of Lord Shang, Wordsworth Editions Limited (1998), at 25.
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Hybrid War by commentators and practitioners. Hybrid Warfare may very well 
constitute a new type of warfare, warranting its recognition as a separate form 
of warfare, or category of full spectrum operations. Hybrid Warfare may use el-
ements from four existing methods and categories of warfare, namely irregular 
warfare (such as Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency), asymmetric warfare (un-
conventional warfare such as partisan warfare), and compound warfare (where 
irregular forces are used simultaneously against an opponent) while being em-
ployed by State actors to augment their otherwise conventional warfare ap-
proach or by non-State actors who use the Hybrid Warfare approach to gain an 
advantage over a conventional warfare opponent. Twentieth Century conflict 
has seen examples of all four forms of warfare and has led to the doctrinal rec-
ognition of these forms of warfare in the us rmy Field Manual on Operations,6 
where so called full spectrum operations account for these different forms of 
war fighting. The attacks of 9/11, with the following campaigns in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Hezbollah’s hybrid war with Israel in 2006, Russia’s Crimean and 
Ukrainian campaigns in 2015 and the emergence of Islamic State isil/Daesh 
in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan have seen the emergence of a new form of war-
fare; a new category which in essence resemble multi-modal conflicts which 
combine and exploit various elements of existing forms of warfare. It is now 
up to the military doctrinal commentators to make a strong case for including 
Hybrid Warfare in the existing strategic doctrines of full spectrum operations 
and not just subsuming it as some subcategory of either compound warfare, 
irregular and asymmetric warfare. Current us Military writing acknowledges 
the existence of Hybrid Warfare without clarifying whether as a new category 
or sub-category. Reflecting on the available writings and commentaries on the 
subject, Hybrid War describes a conflict “in which states or non-state actors ex-
ploit all modes of war simultaneously by using advanced conventional weap-
ons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and disruptive technologies or criminality to 
destabilize an existing order”,7 and which blurs “distinct categories of warfare 
across the spectrum, from active combat to civilian support”.8
6 Field Manual No. 3–0: Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, dc, 
(Final Approved Draft), this publication supersedes fm 3–0, February 5, 2008, p. 3–1.
7 R. Wilkie, ‘Hybrid Warfare – Something Old, Not Something New’, Air & Space Power Journal 
2009, https://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/win09/wilkie.html (last ac-
cessed 1 June 2016).
8 See e.g., u.s. Government Accountability Office, Hybrid Warfare, gao-10-1036R, (2010) cited 
in National Research Council of the National Academies, Improving the Decision Making 
Abilities of Small Unit Leaders, (2012).
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Drawing from his assessment of Israel-Hezbollah’s war of 2006, Frank Hoff-
man, a leading us thinker on Hybrid Threats and Warfare, summarized the ele-
ments of this form of warfare in his seminal work on Hybrid Warfare as follows:
Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare in-
cluding conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, ter-
rorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal 
disorder. Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of 
non-state actors [with or without state sponsorship]. These multi-modal 
activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, 
but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated 
within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical 
and psychological dimensions of conflict.9
While Hoffman’s work on Hybrid Warfare is leading, as it set the military- 
historiographical scene for recognizing such form of warfare as either ‘new’ 
or evolving ‘old’ warfare, it also makes it clear that there is not yet a binding 
definition on the notion in place; instead the ‘hybrid’ element indicates the 
existence of multiple elements and factors which are somehow merged into 
a method of warfare.10 With Hoffman’s subsequent definition of ‘Hybrid’ as 
constituting a modus of war fighting, where the opponent “simultaneously 
and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, 
terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their  political 
objectives”,11 and Brown’s definition12 as a basis, we can try to update the defi-
nition of Hybrid Warfare.
9 F.G. Hoffman, ‘Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute 
for Policy Studies’ (2007), at 8, https//www.potomacinstitute.org/publications/Potomac_ 
HybridWar_0108.pdf, (last accessed 29 February 2016). See also F.G. Hoffman, ‘Hybrid 
threats: Reconceptualising the evolving character of modern conflict’, 240 Strategic  Forum 
(2009) at 1; F.G. Hoffman, ‘Hybrid warfare and challenges’, 52 Joint Forces Quarterly (2009), 
at 1–2.
10 See e.g., P.R. Mansoor, ‘Hybrid Warfare in History’, in W. Murray and P.R. Mansoor (eds.), 
Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (2012).
11 F.G. Hoffman, ‘Hybrid vs. compound war: The Janus choice of modern war: Defining to-
day’s multifaceted conflict’, Armed Forces Journal (2009), at 3.
12 “This aspect of the hybrid war is information warfare combined with irregular warfare 
to achieve strategic impacts. When a civilian casualty occurs it adversely affects the in-
digenous popular support to the legitimate government, the United States and its allies 
as well as international support for the wars through the mainstream media, the – cnn 
effect.” L. Brown ‘Twenty-First Century Warfare Will be Hybrid’, usawc Strategy Research 
Project, United States Army: u.s. Army War College, Class of 2011, (2011) at 20.
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Hybrid warfare appears to be mainly a warfare variant resulting from using 
an economy of ‘force war’, in which State or non-State actors interact with a 
minor traditional military investment. These actors will use indirect and multi-
disciplinary approaches (civil and military, legal and illegal, kinetic and non-
kinetic, high-tech and ‘rock-art’ means, etc.). These actors can employ means 
based on those approaches with the following intentions:
1. causing the end of hostilities before political goals are reached;
2. consolidating stagnant situations – turning them into intractable or 
 ‘simple incidents’;
3. eroding and delegitimizing the internal and external prestige, reputation, 
and support of a superior military force, State or States’ apparatus, and/or 
international organizations;
4. creating confusion in general by questioning agreed political, religious or 
territorial status quo; and
5. building new dependencies and structures on essential-resources to sup-
port consolidated or imposed political, religious or territorial changes.
The most recent definition of Hybrid Warfare can be found in a February 
2016 memorandum by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence to the De-
fence Committee, which highlights some of the just made elements of Hybrid 
Warfare:
Hybrid warfare can be characterised as a comprehensive strategy based 
on a broad, complex, adaptive and often highly integrated combination 
of conventional and unconventional means. It uses overt and covert ac-
tivities, which can include military, paramilitary, irregular and civilian 
actors, targeted to achieve (geo) political and strategic objectives. Hybrid 
warfare is directed at an adversary’s vulnerabilities, focussed on compli-
cating decision making and conducted across the full spectrum (which 
can encompass diplomatic, political, information, military, economic, 
financial, intelligence and legal activity) whilst creating ambiguity and 
deniability. Hybrid strategies can be applied by both state and non-state 
actors.13
13 Ministry of Defence – Written Evidence submitted to Defence Committee, uk Parlia-
ment, 1 March 2016 para. 15, https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevi 
dence.svc/evidencedocument/defence-committee/russia-implications-for-uk-defence 
-and-security/written/28854.pdf (last accessed 31 May 2016).
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In respect to Russia’s use of Hybrid Warfare, Anthony Paphiti and Sascha Dov 
Bachmann find in their written submission to the Defence Committee that 
“The employment of hybrid methods has been evident from Russia’s activi-
ties in Crimea and the Donbas region of Ukraine, with its deployment of ‘little 
green men’, namely, soldiers wearing unmarked uniforms that make direct state 
attribution difficult”.14 Citing Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, Russia’s 
2010 Military Doctrine of modern warfare can be described as entailing:
[…] the integrated utilization of military force and forces and resources 
of a non-military character, [and] the prior implementation of measures 
of information warfare in order to achieve political objectives without 
the utilization of military force and, subsequently, in the interest of shap-
ing a favourable response from the world community to the utilization of 
military force.15
Among the means and methods used by an adversary in a Hybrid Warfare con-
text to reach the intentions above, we can find ‘Lawfare’. Lawfare is using law 
as a weapon with a goal of manipulating the law by changing legal paradigms. 
As stated at the outset, this can be done either maliciously or affirmatively. 
While Lawfare appears to be first defined by Dunlap back in 2001, he refined 
his definition in 2007, stating that Lawfare “is the strategy of using – or misus-
ing – law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an opera-
tional objective.”16
Before addressing Lawfare in detail, including the fine points of some mali-
cious employment thereof, it is relevant for this paper to address in general 
terms how the 28 nato States collectively understand hybrid warfare. This is a 
difficult task as nato does not (yet) have an official definition of Hybrid War-
fare, nor of Lawfare, and the latter is rarely mentioned in daily business.
14 Written evidence submitted by Brigadier (Rtd) Anthony Paphiti, former als officer and 
Dr Sascha Dov Bachmann, Associate Professor in International Law, 1 March 2016, https://
data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/ 
defence-committee/russia-implications-for-uk-defence-and-security/written/28402.pdf 
(last accessed 31 May 2016)).
15 M. Kofman and M. Rojansky, ‘A Closer look at Russia’s “Hybrid War’, Kennan Cable, No. 7, 
( 2015), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJAN 
SKY%20KOFMAN.pdf (last accessed 30 May 2016), citing ‘The Military Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation’ of 5 February 2010, https://carnegieendow-ment.org/files/2010russia_
military_doctrine.pdf, cited at Paphiti & Bachmann, (n. 17).
16 C. Dunlap ‘Lawfare Today: A Perspective’, Yale Journal of International Affairs (2008), at 
146.
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2 nato’s Approach to Hybrid Warfare
In 2014, nato used the term ‘Hybrid warfare’ to describe Russian actions dur-
ing the illegal occupation of Crimea and its subsequent military activities in 
Eastern Ukraine.17 However, it is not the term used by nato’s Supreme Head-
quarters in its 2010 Capstone Concept on the subject.18 Rather, that document 
uses the term ‘hybrid threats’.19 This capstone concept envisions the challenges 
that hybrid threats pose and explains nato’s need “to adapt its strategy, struc-
ture and capabilities accordingly […] to deliver an effective response”.20 In this 
concept, nato defines hybrid threats as “those posed by adversaries, with the 
ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means 
adaptively in pursuit of e their objective”.21
In 2011, nato issued a ‘longsighted’ report, which predicted that States may 
be attracted by non-conventional wars, as hybrid threats “can be largely non- 
attributable, and therefore applied in situations where more overt action is 
ruled out for any number of reasons”.22 Hybrid Threats were defined as mul-
timodal, low intensity, kinetic as well as non-kinetic threats to international 
peace and security.23 Hybrid Threats include asymmetric conflict scenarios, 
global terrorism, piracy, transnational organized crime, demographic challenges, 
resources security, retrenchment from globalization, and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.24 In 2011, nato’s Allied Command Transfor-
mation (act), supported by the u.s. Joint Forces Command Joint Irregular 
Warfare  Centre and the u.s. National Defense University (ndu), conducted 
17 nato Wales Summit Declaration, par 13 Sept 2015, at https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/
official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en.
18 nato – Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Headquarters, ‘Military Contribu-
tion to Countering Hybrid Threats Capstone Concept’, August 2015, www.act.nato.int/the 
-countering-hybrid-threats-concept-development-experiment, 1 (last accessed 1 June 
2016.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 S. Bachmann & H. Gunneriusson ‘Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century’s New Threats to Global 
Peace and Security’, 43 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies 1 (2015), 
at 79.
22 Ibid., referring to S. Bachmann and J. Sanden, ‘Countering Hybrid Eco-threats to Global 
Security Under International Law: The Need for an Comprehensive Legal Approach’, 33 
(3) Liverpool Law Review (2013), at 16.
23 S. Bachmann and J. Sanden, ‘Countering Hybrid Eco-threats to Global Security Under In-
ternational Law: The Need for an Comprehensive Legal Approach’, 33 (3) Liverpool Law 
Review (2013), at 261–289.
24 Supra note 23.
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 specialized  research into ‘Assessing Emerging Security Challenges in the Glo-
balized Environment (Countering Hybrid Threats) Experiment’.25 Its findings 
were in essence that hybrid threats faced by nato and its non-military partners 
required a comprehensive approach allowing a wide spectrum of kinetic and 
 non-kinetic responses, by both military and non-military actors. Essential to 
nato’s planning was the hypothesis that such a comprehensive response will 
have to be in partnership with other stakeholders, such as international and 
regional organizations, as well as representatives of business and commerce.26
nato’s 2011 Concept of Hybrid Threats (cht) and its visionary approach in 
regards to States, such as Russia, and their willingness to use the Hybrid War-
fare concept for aggressive purposes could not be developed further, as in June 
2012 the nato decided to discontinue work on cht on the organizational level 
in favor of member States (with their associated nato Centres of Excellence) 
to continue.
Moving forward to autumn 2014, nato reflected on the Russian aggression 
in Ukraine (including the occupation of Crimea) when declaring its resolution 
to prepare for Russia’s use of Hybrid Warfare and Threats. nato’s Wales Sum-
mit Declaration of September 2014 provides us with a definition for ‘Hybrid 
Warfare’ and its components:
We will ensure that nato is able to effectively address the specific chal-
lenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt 
and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed 
in a highly integrated design. It is essential that the Alliance possesses 
the necessary tools and procedures required to deter and respond effec-
tively to hybrid warfare threats, and the capabilities to reinforce national 
forces.27
This declaration, as well as subsequent publications and announcements 
by nato seem to indicate that nato has accepted the reality of facing 
25 nato, ‘Countering the Hybrid Threat’, https://www.act.nato.int/nato-countering-the 
-hybrid-threat (last accessed 1 June 2016).
26 See ‘Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Ac-
tion Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the Comprehensive Approach’, 4 March 
2011, pp. 1–10 (para. 1), cited in S. Bachmann & H. Gunneriusson, ‘Russia’s Hybrid Warfare 
in the East: Using the Information Sphere As Integral to Hybrid Warfare’, Georgetown Jour-
nal of International Affairs (2015), at 198–212; and S. Bachmann, ‘Hybrid Threats, cyber 
warfare and nato’s comprehensive approach for countering 21st century threats – map-
ping the new frontier of global risk and security management’, 88 Amicus Curiae (2011).
27 Supra note 9.
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 Hybrid  Warfare Threats.28 Whether this amounts to “adapting to the hybrid 
challenge”29 remains to be seen, as nato does not have a Hybrid Warfare con-
cept in place yet and it seems unlikely that the discontinued cht can act as a 
substitute without further significant amendments, which requires not only 
the political will but also a reorganization of the integrated military structure 
in order to implement it.
It can be noted that nato’s attitude contrasts with Russia, which on the 
contrary already has a Hybrid Warfare doctrine (non-linear war or Gera-
simov Doctrine)30 in place, which it successfully applied to its campaigns in 
2014/2015. The fact that Russia is keen on using non-linear war demonstrates 
that this type of warfare not only include non-State actors but also states. To-
day, we have blatant examples of States, like non-State entities do, that find 
this type of warfare very appealing for it reduces the need for using classical 
military resources – no need to use only kinetic means. Further, and perhaps 
more significantly, prima facie it preserves some amount of legitimacy, or at 
least reduces the erosion of apparent legitimacy, due to the non-attributable 
aspects inherent in hybrid warfare when using non-lethal Hybrid Warfare 
methods such as Law fare.
On 1 December 2015, nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Euro-
pean Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, an-
nounced the cooperation on aspects of a new Hybrid Warfare program and a 
new nato Hybrid Warfare Strategy. Currently, challenges by Russia and Daesh, 
among others, to alter the Euro-Atlantic security order and Middle Eastern sta-
bility are executed using elements of Hybrid Warfare. Countering such threats 
made it necessary for nato to adopt its new Hybrid Warfare strategy, which is 
to be developed and announced this year.
3 Law as a Weapon: Zeus versus Hades
Lawfare is, generally speaking, a method of war, like others, using non-kinetic 
means and intending to influence the adversary for the benefit of strategic 
28 See e.g., J.A. Davis, ‘Continued Evolution of Hybrid Threats – The Russian Hybrid Threat 
Construct and the Need for Innovation’, https://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/three 
swords/CONTINUED_EVOLUTION_OF_HYBRID_THREATS.pdf (last accessed 1 March 
2016).
29 Cf. A. Jacobs and G. Lasconjarias, ‘nato’s Hybrid Flanks – Handling Unconventional War-
fare in the South and the East’, nato Research Division- Research Paper, No.112 (2015).
30 P. Pomerantsev, ‘How Putin is Reinventing Warfare’, Foreign Policy (2014), foreignpolicy.
com/2014/05/05/how-putin-is-reinventing-warfare/ (last accessed 5 October 2015).
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 objectives. Lawfare has traditionally been seen to have a negative connotation, 
namely as the use of law by the opponent and not as means of own war fight-
ing capacities, when used affirmatively to achieve own military and political 
objectives as we will show in this short submission. A parallelism may be used 
with the eternal fight between good and evil represented by that of Zeus and 
Hades. Lawfare, as the use of law as a weapon, highlights this: if used to dis-
tort the rule of law’s leading principles and underpinnings, it would qualify as 
Hadesian, if used to reaffirm and strengthen the principles of law, it would be 
Zeusian.
At this stage it is important to note that Lawfare can be used in the context 
of Hybrid Warfare and/or ‘influence operations’. Since influence operations 
mainly consist of “non-kinetic, communications-related, and informational 
activities that aim to affect cognitive, psychological, motivational, ideational, 
ideological, and moral characteristics of a target audience”,31 Lawfare fits as 
one of the methods that influence operations can employ. Although Lawfare 
needs to use communications-related and informational activities through 
media and Strategic Information Operations (InfoOps/StratCom to become a 
‘weapon’, Lawfare is not subordinate to them. A good analogy to understand 
how Lawfare reaches the desired ‘target’ is to see it as the warhead of a mis-
sile, while media and InfoOps/StratCom would be powering the flight of that 
missile. After seeing some examples below, we may be in a better position to 
understand Lawfare. The authors are hesitant to provide an absolute definition 
of the concept of Lawfare, which at this point such would be extremely vague. 
A most recent commentator, Ordre Kittrie, characterizes Lawfare actions as:
(1) the actor uses law to create the same or similar effects as those tra-
ditionally sought from conventional kinetic military actions – including 
impacting the key armed forces decision-making and capabilities of the 
target; and (2) one of the actor’s motivations is to weaken or destroy an 
adversary against which the Lawfare is being deployed.32
In the case of the current situation in Russia and Ukraine, Lawfare has its 
roots in an undefined situation, i.e., the lack of definition of the conflict – in-
ternational armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, or civil unrest. 
This ambiguous situation creates patent confusion as to the source or para-
digm of applicable law and any eventual action to identify and assign legal 
31 E. Larson et al., Foundations of Effective Influence Operations. A Framework for Enhancing 
Army Capabilities (2009), at 3–4.
32 O. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (2015), at 8.
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 responsibilities and demand accountability. The same occurs in the case of 
the 2008 and 2014 conflicts between Israel and Hamas, after the 2005 Israeli 
disengagement from the Gaza Strip. Drawing upon the idea of Sascha Dov 
Bachmann,33 we can affirm the following with respect to the limits imposed by 
international law in conventional conflicts: (i) in the former example, and in 
the context of jus ad bellum, where Russia denies being an active agent in the 
conflict, law is evaded and misused; and (ii) in the latter example, and in the 
context of jus in bello, where Hamas uses human shields and protected places, 
law is ignored or simply dismissed.34
However, Hybrid Warfare tools, such as Lawfare, are not only focused on jus 
in bello, but also on areas relating to the interpretation and implementation of 
international obligations, as we will see below, which fall in the realm of jus ad 
bellum. In conclusion, ‘modern’ Hybrid Warfare not only presents challenges 
to international peace and security, but also undermines current national and 
international legal frameworks by questioning the validity of existing public 
international law rules applicable in international relations in peace time and 
times of war.
The inherent criterion of ambiguity in Hybrid Warfare has to be consid-
ered when looking into the impact of this type of war on current international 
humanitarian law and human rights law, and on public international law in 
 general. The difficulty for defining a hybrid conflict impedes also its character-
ization as an international armed conflict, a non-international armed conflict, 
or a simple civil unrest. This creates an uncertainty in the law-abiding party of a 
hybrid situation, which forces it to demonstrate that an abuse of international 
law is taking place. Given these legal uncertainties arising from the “fog of Law-
fare”, it becomes apparent the potential role it actually plays in the context of 
Hybrid Warfare. Lawfare in this context thrives on legal ambiguity and exploits 
legal thresholds and fault lines. Applied by an adversary, both State and non-
State actors, which untied to the need to comply with international law and 
the rule of law, Lawfare can exploit the disadvantages of legal restrictions in 
place for the compliant actor leading to the emergence of “asymmetric warfare 
by abusing laws”.35
33 (n. 21).
34 S. Reeves, R. Barnsby, ‘The New Griffin of War. Hybrid International Armed Conflicts’, 
43(3) Harvard International Review (2013), at 18. See also Bachmann, supra note 6, at 
90–93.
35 See https://thelawfareproject.org/lawfare/what-is-lawfare-1/ (last accessed 1June 2016) for 
the term and related discussions.
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A commonly recognized methodology for defining the nature of conflict 
was established by the icty in Tadi: “an armed conflict exists whenever there 
is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State.” 36 These criteria appear to be inadequate or insufficient to 
characterize conflicts dominated by Hybrid Warfare methods, as these are 
intended to disguise the actual facts. Therefore, the necessary attribution of 
direction or control in a conflict, which entirely depends on the appreciation 
and assessment of facts, becomes a ‘mission impossible’ in Hybrid Warfare 
environments where subterfuge dominates the stage. This situation dimin-
ishes the authority of international humanitarian law and human rights law 
(and public international law in general), and parties will then tend to “empha-
size the idea of military necessity [,which] deteriorat[es] legal incentives to 
act humanely”.37
The malicious exploitation of international treaty law equates to the abuse of 
Lawfare as a weapon, means respectively of Hybrid Warfare. There are possibili-
ties to use law as a weapon in a positive manner, affirmatively, i.e., in form of so 
called “bankrupting terrorism” lawsuits (cf. Shurat HaDin Israel Law Center) us-
ing this term to refer to US–Israeli terrorism litigation, referring to civil litigation 
before us Federal Court which is directed against “funding” activities (e.g. direct 
payments to terrorist groups) and other forms of aiding and abetting (such as 
the provision of material support) qualifying as “indirect liability” for acts of Is-
lamist terrorism38 and State sponsored terrorism, such as Russia’s liability for 
shooting down mh-17.39 However, there remains a risk that when using Lawfare 
affirmatively, the adversary may end up ‘boomeranging’ it in a malicious man-
ner. These examples show that the abuse or good use of Lawfare are often close-
ly linked, as Lawfare covers any use of law for a specific military purpose.
4 Lawfare in Armed Conflicts: When Law is Misused and Ignored
As we have seen above, an example of the Zeusian use of Lawfare is the 
case where nato launched a media campaign in Afghanistan stating that 
36 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. it-94-1-i, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
 Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Oct. 2, 1995), 70.
37 Reeves and Barnsby, supra note 35, at 18.
38 S. Bachmann, ‘Terrorism Litigation As Deterrence Under International Law – From Pro-
tecting Human Rights to Countering Hybrid Threats’, 87 Amicus Curiae, at 22–26.
39 See S. Bachmann, ‘Malaysia Airlines Flight mh17: the day Russia became a state sponsor 
of Terrorism’, 99 Amicus Curiae 2014.
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nato fighters will not fire on positions if civilians are nearby. The Taliban, 
in turn, used this campaign to develop tactics by boomeranging nato’s cam-
paign in the form of malicious Lawfare. The Taliban, for their benefit and as 
military advantage, regularly placed civilians near their positions.40 This was 
extremely disadvantageous for nato and although its media campaign used 
Lawfare affirmatively, the Taliban recognized this and exploited it a Hadesian 
manner.41
Another example for the malicious use of Lawfare has been demonstrat-
ed by Hamas during the Gaza wars of 2008 and 2014. The European Union 
strongly condemned Hamas’ calls on the civilian population of Gaza to ‘offer’ 
themselves as human shields.42 During those two wars Hamas tactic of launch-
ing rocket attacks from densely populated areas into Israeli territory was part 
of its standard operating practice. This amounted to intentionally disregarding 
international humanitarian law and human rights law. In fact, these violations 
have to be qualified as a contumelious use of Lawfare. This fact is also disturb-
ing from the standpoint of the principle of reciprocity in International Hu-
manitarian Law. Actually, while disturbing, it also confirms the International 
Court of Justice’s findings in the Nicaragua case, in relation to the lack of reci-
procity in non-regular conflicts.43
This malicious employment of Lawfare by Hamas against an adversary fol-
lowing the rule of law, forced Israel to apply much more precise legal calcula-
tions regarding target selection and targeting. These deliberations had to take 
place in the fog of war and with the intention to distinguish, beyond any rea-
sonable doubt, legitimate military targets. It appears that Israel, concerned for 
its image in the media and mindful of global opinion, may have ‘overacted’ in its 
operational proactive Lawfare efforts by increasing the protection of civilians 
in Gaza through precautions taken and warnings issued to unprecedented lev-
els in modern warfare. This augmented to the point that some think Israel took 
40 Dunlap, supra note 12.
41 nato, in order to avoid criticism of its air campaign, used a media campaign with hidden 
legal content that, in turned, was use by the Taliban as lawfare by placing civilians nearby 
their positions. ‘nato would not fire on positions if it knew there were civilians nearby 
[…] [if] there is the likelihood of even one civilian casualty, we will not strike’. C. Dunlap 
‘Airpower’ in T. Rid, T. Keaney (ed.), Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare: Doctrine, 
Operations, and Challenges (Oxon, Routledge, 2010), at 107.
42 European Union, 5 August 2015, ‘eu Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Pro-
cess’, eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_15300_en.htm,.<www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
press/press-releases/2015/07/20-fac-mepp-conclusions> (last accessed 1 June 2016).
43 Judgment (Merits), Nicaragua v. United States of America, icj, 1985, para. 218.
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“many more precautions than are required”.44 According to international legal 
experts, in 2014 Israel forces remarkably prevented civilian casualties while 
fighting Hamas. Willy Stern, of Vanderbilt Law School, describes how Israel 
made thousands of telephone calls, leaflet drops, tv, and radio messages to 
Gaza residents trying to minimize ‘collateral’ casualties. Israeli action included 
“calls to influential citizens urging them to evacuate residents, and in doing so 
gave the terrorist enemy detailed information about its troop movements”.45 
Israel’s entire effort ‘targeted’ public opinion in order to remove an ‘endemic’ 
belief that Israel behaved inhumanely when conducting military operations in 
Gaza, which has immensely deteriorated its law-abiding image.46
The conclusion of some international experts is that the Zeusian way 
 Israel uses Lawfare is creating a precedent that Hamas-like groups may use 
to their advantage as Taliban did with nato in Afghanistan.47 However, since 
the  Israeli behavior aims to remove from public opinion the perception on 
how  Israel conducts and reviews military operations, that advantage may be 
a short-term one. This manifests the abovementioned conflicting reality, i.e., 
Lawfare employed maliciously versus Lawfare employed affirmatively.
44 W. Heintschel von Heinegg quoted in ‘Int’l Legal Experts Slam idf – For  Over- Warning 
Gazans. Experts from us, Germany warn idf ‘legal zeal’ sets dangerous precedent tying 
hands of democracies fighting terror’, https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News 
.aspx/196506 (last accessed 03 February 2017).
45 Ibid., Willy Stern: ‘It was abundantly clear that idf commanders had gone beyond any 
mandates that international law requires to avoid civilian casualties’.
46 See e.g. Time, ‘un Human Rights Council Launches Inquiry Into Gaza conflict’, 24 July 
2014, https://time.com/3027716/israel-gaza-hamas-netanyahu-un-human-rights-council/ 
(last accessed 1 June 2016).
47 Ibid. “Indeed, international legal experts quoted in the article argued that the idf’s  actions 
do go to inappropriate measures, and may end up harming the ability to fight terrorist or-
ganizations. W. Heintschel von Heinegg, “[the idf] is setting an unreasonable precedent 
for other democratic countries of the world who may also be fighting in asymmetric wars 
against brutal non-state actors who abuse these laws.” Michael Schmitt, director of the 
Stockton Center for the Study for International Law at the us Naval War College, support-
ed that idea that the idf is creating a dangerous state of affairs that may harm the West 
in its fight against terrorism. Schmitt said, “[t]he idf’s warnings certainly go beyond what 
the law requires, but they also sometimes go beyond what would be operational good 
sense elsewhere […] People are going to start thinking that the United States and other 
Western democracies should follow the same examples in different types of conflict. 
That’s a real risk”. See also M. Schmitt and J. Merriam ‘A Legal and Operational Assess-
ment of Israel’s Targeting Practices’, Just Security, 24 April 2015, https://www.justsecurity 
.org/22392/legal-operational-assessment-israels-targeting-practices/ (last accessed 12 
August 2015).
Mosquera and Bachmann
<UN>
78
journal of international humanitarian legal studies 7 (2016) 63-87
These two cases appear to suggest that when a party uses Lawfare as 
a “ necessary element of mission accomplishment” in Hybrid Warfare 
situations,48 the other party, who considers itself in disadvantage force-wise, 
will transform any adherence to the rule of law by its adversary into a ‘legal 
boomerang’. This boomerang would carry a piece of Hadesian Lawfare, which 
intends to paralyze the adversary or, at least, anesthetize the rule of law – 
government/administration structures of that law-abiding adversary. Along 
these lines, Lin argues:
[T]errorists are waging Lawfare and hijacking the rule of law as another 
way of fighting, to the detriment of humanitarian values as well as the law 
itself. Using human shields, abusing international law and post-conflict 
investigations to blur the line between legitimate counter-terror tactics 
and human rights violations, Lawfare – similar to terror tunnels – is also 
becoming an effective counter-measure against the superiority of west-
ern air power.49
Drawing the idea from Toni Pfanner,50 in Hybrid Warfare we could argue that, 
as a consequence of those using weakly and rhetorically international law and 
judicial processes, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 
may become inapplicable, as it provides only partial answers. Moreover, this 
inapplicability may also be anchored in the idea that abiding by the law may 
also become inconsistent with perceived interests of the warring parties.
However, two points need to be remarked. First, this understanding would 
be equivalent to abandoning the legal battlespace to deniers of the rule of law. 
In this vein, Dunlap considers that “Lawfare is more than something adversar-
ies seek to use against law-abiding societies; it is a resource that democratic 
militaries can – and should – employ affirmatively”.51 Bilsborough considers 
that this employment must be done by “map[ping] the contours of interna-
tional law (particularly the law of armed conflict) and structure their opera-
tions accordingly”.52 There is room for a Zeusian use of Lawfare.
48 C. Dunlap, ‘Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st Century Conflicts?’, 54 Joint Force 
Quarterly (2009), at 35.
49 C. Lin, ‘Israel, China, and us/nato – Counter-Terrorism as War Crimes?’, 287 ispsw Strat 
egy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security (2014), at 1.
50 T. Pfanner ‘Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and humani-
tarian action’, 87 (857) International Review of the Red Cross (2005) at 165.
51 Dunlap, supra note 21.
52 S. Bilsborough ‘Counterlawfare in Counterinsurgency’, Small War Journals, (2011), at 2.
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In order to prepare military operations within the contours of international 
law, using Lawfare affirmatively, politicians and commanders alike need to 
train, before any actual conflict, difficult and complex legal scenarios with ma-
jor and lasting impact, on internal and external public opinions. These scenar-
ios will have: (i) short-lead response time to prepare a sound moral and legal 
case for forces intervention; (ii) high political consequences; (iii) likely future 
court review; and (iv) intervention of international organization53 infiltrated 
by Hadesian Lawfare practitioners, as well as nongovernmental organizations 
(ngos),54 and multinationals.55 Consequently, the shaping of the legal bat-
tlespace requires drafting contingency plans and conducting exercises based 
on those premises.
Secondly, we must never forget that public opinion is by nature coachable 
and therefore malleable. For this reason alone, we cannot afford to think na-
ively and argue that Lawfare has to rely exclusively on its legal paradigms; the 
legality and legitimacy of (military) action are first and foremost subject to 
the scrutiny of public opinion. Consequently, any successful counter-Lawfare 
action, or Zeusian use of Lawfare, against ‘boomerangs’ must not be limited in 
scope, but comprehensive and holistic, as it will have to aim at establishing the 
right perceptions among the internal and external public opinions.
5 Lawfare in International Relations: When Law is Misused  
and Abused
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine agreed to transfer the nuclear 
weapons to Russia and in return it asked for security assurances. In 1994, the 
so-called Budapest Memorandum56 was signed by Ukraine, Russia, the  United 
53 “[T]he pa and its allies have turned numerous international organizations into lawfare 
battlegrounds. As a result, one international organization (unesco) has been weakened 
by having its budget slashed, and another (the un Human Rights Council) has been large-
ly diverted from accomplishing its original mandate”, in Kittrie, supra note 33, at 339.
54 Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, https://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/ngo_lawfare, 
(last accessed 21 February 2016).
55 As targets, note the hacking of Sony before the screening of the movie ‘The Interview’, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/sony-hack, (last accessed 20 February 2016). As a weapon, 
cf the case Linde v. Arab Bank, https://www.osenlaw.com/case/arab-bank-case, (last ac-
cessed 20 February 2016).
56 United Nations Document a/49/765, s/1994/1399, 19 December 1994, https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/507/64/PDF/N9450764.pdf?OpenElement, (last 
accessed 3 June 2016).
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States, and the United Kingdom. In that memorandum, the parties agreed 
to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of 
Ukraine” and “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of Ukraine”.57
In March 2015, Russia argued that any allegation of Russia’s violation of its 
international obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum would show 
that the text of the agreement had not been read by those alleging Russian in-
volvement in the events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The Russian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs emphasizes that:
In the memorandum, we also undertook to refrain from the threat or use 
of force against Ukraine’s territorial integrity or political independence. 
And this provision has been fully observed. Not a single shot was fired on 
its territory during which, or before, the people of Crimea and Sevastopol 
were making crucial decisions on the status of the peninsula. The over-
whelming majority of the population of Crimea and Sevastopol, in a free 
expression of their will, exercised their right to self-determination, and 
Crimea returned to Russia. As for the ongoing attempts to accuse us of 
military interference in the events in southeastern Ukraine, the authors 
of these claims have not presented a shred of conclusive evidence yet.
Furthermore, neither in the Budapest Memorandum, nor in any other 
document, has Russia pledged to force a section of Ukraine to remain 
as part of the country against the will of the local population. The loss 
of Ukraine’s territorial integrity has resulted from complicated internal 
processes, which Russia and its obligations under the Budapest Memo-
randum have nothing to do with.58
Reading this official statement in conjunction with the official text of the 1994 
Budapest Memoradum, we can easily identify a misinformation campaign. 
The significant element here is that the metaphorical ‘warhead’ of this Russian 
campaign is Lawfare. The statement mixes specific characteristics of Hybrid 
Warfare, namely denial – “Not a single shot was fired on its [Ukraine] territory 
57 Ibid., at 2, para. 2.
58 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Ministry Spokesman 
Alexander Lukashevich answers a media question about the situation around the Bu-
dapest Memorandum, 12 March 2015, https://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/CC1C845CAA-
26D5A043257E07004BF6EB (last accessed 12 August 2015).
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during which, or before, the people of Crimea and Sevastopol were making cru-
cial decisions on the status of the peninsula” – with deliberate disinformation 
regarding the scope of existing treaty obligations, thus creating deliberately 
confusion of the public opinion. This outcome is the result of using Lawfare 
affirmatively, or maliciously, by Russia in a very effective way.
Such malicious use of Lawfare to ‘negate’ the validity of treaties and to void 
the inherent principle of international law’s pacta sunt servanda, qualifies as a 
concept of treaty abuse, as a special case of the concept of abus de droit.59 This 
concept of ‘abuse of right’ relates to situations, where States or international 
organizations (or other subjects of international law), as parties to an interna-
tional agreement, interpret and apply its provisions depending on the particu-
lar circumstances in order to benefit from such a deviation. In this context, the 
parties not applying the agreement can claim circumstantially that the other 
party exercises the agreement’s provisions abusively.
An interesting case of Lawfare in international relations is that of Yasser Ara-
fat’s off-the-record statements made on 10 May 1994 at a mosque while visiting 
Johannesburg, South Africa. A journalist from 702 Talk Radio, Bruce Whitfield, 
secretly recorded it. This took place few months before the signature of the 
Oslo Accords on 29 August 1994. Arafat alluded cryptically to the agreement 
comparing it to one of the Prophet Muhammad in similar circumstances:
This agreement I am not considering it more than the agreement which 
had been signed between our prophet Muhammad and Quraysh. And 
you remember, Caliph Omar had refused this agreement and considering 
the agreement of the very low class. But Muhammad had accepted it and 
we are accepting now this peace accord.60
Arafat’s allusion to the Hudaybiyya agreement (truce) was the object of several 
discussions and disagreements among commentators, which point to a sort of 
Lawfare. In 628 c.e a group of one thousand Muslims set off for a trip to Mecca 
in order to perform the umrah pilgrimage. The Muslims hoped that the Mec-
cans would allow them to enter the city, but they did not. To avoid bloodshed, 
the two parties decided to avoid warfare and concluded an agreement or truce. 
On the one hand, some commentators thought Arafat sent a clandestine mes-
sage about his true intentions and read the Quran in a biased manner:
59 M. Byers ‘Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age’, 47 McGill Law Journal (2002). at 
397–404.
60 See https://www.textfiles.com/politics/arafat.txt, (last accessed 23 August 2015).
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In the twenty-two months after signing the treaty, Muhammad signifi-
cantly built up his power base. He made new conquests and formed al-
liances … with the Bani Khuza’a. As a result, by 630, he was considerably 
stronger vis-à-vis Quraysh than at the time of the signing. Quraysh did less 
well in terms of making new alliances, but it did ally with  another strong 
tribe, the Bani Bakr […] In December 629, some of the Bani Bakr, possibly 
with Quraysh help, took vengeance on a party of the Bani Khuza’a, killing 
several of the latter. On hearing this news, Muhammad instantly opted 
for the most drastic response – to attack Mecca […] In response, Quraysh 
sent a delegation to Muhammad, petitioning him to maintain the treaty, 
and offering (as was the Arabian fashion) material compensation for the 
lives of the dead men. Muhammad, however, had no interest in a com-
promise and rejected all Quraysh entreaties.61
On the other hand, other publicists consider that Arafat’s intention could not 
have a double-meaning as the interpretation of the Hudaybiyya agreement 
(truce) has to be done properly:
Quraysh and the tribe of Banu Bakr attacked the Banu Khuza’ah tribe, 
who were allies of the Muslims […] Khuza’ah took refuge in the precincts 
of the Ka’bah, but their enemies pursued them even there, and killed a 
number of them. This incident directly violated the Treaty of Hudaybi-
yya, and Banu Khuza’ah […] then, the Prophet did not act in haste. In-
stead, he sent a letter to Quraysh demanding payment of blood money 
for those killed, and a disbandment of their alliance with the Banu Bakr. 
Otherwise, the Prophet said, the treaty would be declared null and void 
[…] Abu Sufyan, traveled to Medina to reinstate the treaty […] His tardy 
announcement, however, went unheeded by the Muslims and Abu Sufy-
an returned to Mecca. It was only after the Muslims had honored a treaty 
that was largely disadvantageous to them, and after they had refused to 
respond to Quraysh’s breach of the contract and its subsequent nullifica-
tion, that the Prophet prepared to retake Mecca.62
61 D. Pipes ‘[Al-Hudaybiya and] Lessons from the Prophet Muhammad’s Diplomacy’, Middle 
East Quarterly (1999), https://www.danielpipes.org/316/al-hudaybiya-and-lessons-from-
the-prophet-muhammads, (last accessed 23 August 2015).
62 M. Abu Sway ‘The Concept of Hudna (Truce) in Islamic Sources. The origin and impli-
cation of hudna’, 13(3) The Palestine-Israel Journal (2006) https://www.pij.org/details 
.php?id=860 (last accessed 23 August 2015).
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As a conclusion, we can argue that no matter what version is true, either the 
Muslims or the Quarysh misused the agreement for a strategic advantage. 
However, most importantly is to note that Arafat referring to this passage of 
the Quran during the Oslo Accord negotiations started a new episode of Law-
fare based on past events and resting on the concept of abus de droit in its 
modality of treaty abuse.
The practice of treaty abuse constitutes an incorrect use of the actual agree-
ment, notwithstanding of the violating party’s ‘justifications’ to the contrary. 
Moreover, the incorrect use of an international agreement cannot be justified 
by the legal discretiongiven by international law makers to those applying it, 
as that discretion is not absolute. The limits of discretion are justified by the 
principle of good faith. In this regard, the International Court of Justice in the 
Oil Platform case established that:
[t]he Court recalls that, according to customary international law as ex-
pressed in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 
23 May 1969, a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose.63
In international law the principle that good faith prevails is paramount, and it 
is described in international relations as “[…] idea[s] of community, tolerance, 
and trust, the basic prerequisites for the development of international law”.64 
Hugh Thirlway argued that “[w]here an obligation, legal or conventional, is de-
fined by specific words, good faith requires respect not only for the words but 
also for the spirit”.65
Since an “international treaty-compliance police” has not been established 
under customary international law, good faith underpins all cross-border re-
lations among States as the sine qua non of any pacta sunt servanda. In this 
regard, Virally reflects the following in results of the 7th session of the Interna-
tional Law Commission at Cambridge 1983 (Section 6): “L’État ayant souscrit 
un engagement purement politique est soumis á l’obligation générale de bonne 
63 Judgment (Preliminary Objections), Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, 
icj, 12 December 1996, at 812.
64 D. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity (2001), at 137.
65 H. Thirlway ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960–1989, Part 
One’, 60 British Yearbook of International Law 4, (1989) at 25.
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foi qui régit le comportement des sujets du droit international dans leurs rapports 
mutuels”.66
At this point, we would like to affirm our view that the deliberate 
 non-application of good faith when implementing international agreements 
amounts to Hadesian Lawfare. However, this can be argued only if the follow-
ing conditions67 are met:
a) Although the action may be permitted by the international agreement, it 
renders the purpose of the agreement null and void;
b) Although the action may be based in the interpretation rules established 
by Articles 31–33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of the Trea-
ties, the understanding is clearly unfounded; and
c) Although the actions may be difficult to characterize as breaches of an 
international obligation, the party in breach describes the facts rhetori-
cally using law arguments that clearly demean it.
In support of these criteria, one can argue that the situation in Ukraine shows 
that Russia has engaged in Hybrid Warfare not only against Ukraine, but also 
against nato by distorting international law. An example is President Putin’s 
declaration that Russia intervened, under international humanitarian law, “to 
defend the rights of Russian-speakers living abroad”.68  These commentators 
present Russia’s abuse of law and argue that any Russian claim to have the right 
of intervention in Ukraine under international humanitarian law must prove:
the urgent humanitarian catastrophe it seeks to avert and why there is 
no alternative to its action […] [i]t should not act by stealth and revert 
to the “big lie”, denying that its forces are engaged, denying that its mis-
sile units shot down Malaysian airliner mh17, and pretending to be the 
peacemaker.69
66 M. Virally, ‘Textes internationaux ayant une portée juridique dans les relations mutuelles 
entre leurs auteurs et textes qui en sont dépourvus’, 60 Annuaire de l’Institute de Droit 
International (1984), at 228.
67 The idea is drawn from U. Linderfalk ‘The Concept of Treaty Abuse: On the Exercise of 
Legal Discretion’. Final Draft Version (2014), at 37, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2526051, (last accessed 20 August 2015).
68 Cited in E. Buckley and I. Pascu,’nato’s Article 5 and Russian Hybrid Warfare’, Atlantic 
Council 17 March 2015, https:// http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-s-
article-5-and-russian-hybrid-warfare (last accessed 17 August 2015).
69 See e.g., Buckley and Pascu, ibid.
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Mark Voyger in support of the above argues that “[w]hile Russia is not in 
control of the entire international legal system, and thus not fully capable of 
changing it ‘de jure’, it is definitely trying to erode its fundamental principles 
‘de facto’”. He also presents his argument with relevant examples of how Russia 
uses Lawfare extensively and in its different approaches in order to give sense 
to Gerasimov’s doctrine:
a) Modification of internal laws to affect external territories: “bill amend-
ment on the incorporation of territories of neighbouring States providing 
for the annexation of regions of neighbouring States following popular 
local referenda (FEB–MAR 2014)”;
b) Citizenship: “citizen law amendment using residency claims dating back 
to ussr and Russian Empire to grant current Russian citizenship (APR 
2014);
c) Passports: “the practice of giving away Russian passports to claim the 
presence of Russian citizens in neighbouring regions (Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Crimea);
d) Misuse of United Nations Security Council: “the attempts to use the un sc 
to sanction potential Russian opening of “humanitarian corridors”.”
e) Use of ‘fake’ internal legal proceedings: “the sentencing of Ukrainian of-
ficials in absentia by Russian courts”; and
f) Misleading use of the term “peacekeeping”: “the vigorous propaganda 
fabricating a legal case to justify the sending of Russian “peacekeeping 
forces” into East Ukraine to prevent “a humanitarian catastrophe” or “a 
genocide” against Russian speakers”.70
The above shows that Russia is currently using Lawfare maliciously with the 
aim of confusing public opinion by debasing law. The interpretation of inter-
national agreements in a circumstantial manner amounts to lack of good faith, 
which ends up being an abus de droit and can give rise to State responsibility,71 
in the case of Russia as an example for States supporting non-State actors. 
On this point, more longitudinal studies on other fundamental elements of 
70 M. Voyger, ‘Russia’s Use of ‘Legal’ as an Element of its Comprehensive Warfare Strategy’ 
1(2) Land Power Magazine (2015), at 20.
71 ‘1075th Meeting’, 1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970, (1971) at 181, para. 40. 
See also ilc, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001’, 
https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/rsiwa/rsiwa.html (last accessed 3 June 2016), and the  ‘Articles 
on the Responsibility of International Organizations New York’, (2011), https://legal 
.un.org/avl/ha/ario/ario.html, (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
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 international responsibility are required to produce empirical data and ob-
servations in support of the argument that those using malicious Lawfare, 
amounting to abus de droit, bear responsibility for internationally wrongful 
acts.
 Conclusion
The main conclusions of this paper is that the inherent complexity and ambi-
guity of Hybrid Warfare creates not only new security but also legal challenges 
for those adhering to international law within the frameworks established un-
der and governed by the principles of the rule of law. Unscrupulous and mali-
cious use of Lawfare by State and non-State actors alike must not discourage 
international actors from continuing to act in compliance with international 
law. Zeus must not give up in spite of Hades’ temporary successes.
In such a legal (and ethical) asymmetry law-abiding international environ-
ment, actors need to use Lawfare affirmatively to ensure that public interna-
tional law is being applied within its full remit. Such ‘preemptive’ Zeusian 
Lawfare will give the political and military leadership the necessary room to 
fine-tune the planning and conduction of military operations reflecting on an-
ticipated Lawfare by the opponent. Lawfare counteraction has extreme limita-
tions in terms of time, space and applicable procedures. Law-abiding actors 
will be confronted with short-lead time for political decision-making and mili-
tary planning based on incomplete intelligence and open-source information, 
an incommensurate broadness of the battlespace – tangible and virtual, and 
the ‘dictates’ of compliance with the rule of law: to follow democratic proce-
dures and be subject to court review and public opinion scrutiny. Moreover, 
law-abiding actors will also confront both international organizations to which 
they belong and which have been ‘infected”,72 by Hadesian Lawfare and inter-
national tribunals used by non-law-abiders who know the non-intuitive nature 
of international humanitarian law.73 This requires a comprehensive legal ap-
proach and broader legal interoperability, which includes the use of affirma-
tive Lawfare in an offensive and defensive manner.
This paper on Hybrid War has shown some examples of malicious Lawfare 
as a central component of a Hybrid Warfare concept of a non-law-abiding 
 opponent-/enemy. Above, the authors offer some suggestions to the political 
and military leaders of democratic law-abiding States on how to use Lawfare 
72 Kittrie, supra note 33, at 339.
73 Ibid., at 215.
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as an element of one’s own comprehensive counter-strategy. The examples of 
Hamas and Russia, which were used in the text to highlight what might be-
come a new trend in 21st century conflict, with the evolving situation in Syria 
and Iraq highlighting this trend. The use of Hadesian Lawfare yields tangible 
benefits for its operators as it distorts public opinion and the ethical-legal dis-
course in societies, which are compliant with international law and the rule 
of law. This is when the international legal reality gets murky and desperately 
calls for a Zeusian Lawfare as part of a comprehensive counterstrategy against 
such threats and means.
Employing Zeusian Lawfare also means that Lawfare must be approached 
as a means of warfare, a weapon: Lawfare can be used in an offensive (extra 
warnings, targeting recording, sanctions) or defensive (media training on 
selected topics, safeguarding of inquiry processes, information liaison with 
courts) manner against an opponent who is prone to ignoring the rule of law. 
The examplesof Hamas in Israel/Palestine and the Taliban in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan with their disregard and even contempt for international humanitar-
ian law and human rights law highlight the need for such proactive Lawfare. 
This, however, requires extensive pre-planning and continuous training of 
their users in order to convince the political (and military) leadership with 
sound arguments in support of Lawfare actions to counter the malicious ap-
plication of law.
To conclude, Lawfare appears taking up a necessary and central role as a 
main component of current Hybrid Warfare operations and opens a broad 
spectrum for specialist and collaborative research by both academia and prac-
titioners, for warfare is part of the world we live in. Our role as democratic so-
cieties in times of War and Conflict is governed by rules and adherence to the 
rule of law unlike our opponents’ conduct. By opting for affirmative Lawfare 
qualified within legal constraints, we ensure that our choice of how to respond 
to threats of Hybrid Warfare will not only be successful but also legitimate.
